

Series II  
Subjects Files,  
1916-1973

Box 12, Folder 2

December 1947 -  
January 1952

08 16

8 December 1947

Memo for Captain Hartung:

1. I concur with paragraph 1 of the basic letter. These publications are probably still in the War College. They are unimportant.
2. I do not concur with the general substance of paragraph 4. Room N-12 belongs to this office, and has been used for that purpose until the detachment of Captain Smith. It is still occupied by a portion of the Analytical Staff.
3. It is necessary to analyze two battles in separate places because the papers get readily fouled up if analyzed in one place. It is not my idea that this section is to be permanently handicapped by a shortage of personnel even tho the allowance has been set at 3. That allowance was set by Eupers and has not as yet been accepted by this command.
4. It might have been well had Hay discussed this matter with me before forwarding recommendations concerning my department to the President.
5. I appreciate your sending this to me for comment.

R. W. Bates

0817

9 December 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

1. The Analytical Section is working on the Battles as desired by the Historians. However, it should be pointed out that the entire work is a painfully slow process because of the exploration required, so that this section may not meet a date desired by the Historians.

2. This section hopes that the Historians will be advised that the functions of this section are in no way related to theirs and that, whereas it is not believed that the War College will object to their using the War College findings, nevertheless they should not try to guide the studies here.

3. War College Analyses have been classified as confidential. Therefore, whereas the narratives are not "confidential" and can be used by the Historians, the comments by the Analytical Section are necessarily so and cannot be used in their non-classified volumes. If the Historians' non-classified volume can use our classified material, then why classify our material.

R. W. Bates

0818

19 December 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

I made the trip to Washington with the necessary papers for the production of the Battle of the Coral Sea, and it was well received by the responsible officers in Eupers. They seemed to feel that the papers which I delivered were the ones which they desired, and said that they hoped to get it out within 6 weeks. I also increased the number of papers to 500, and suggested that we might even ask for more as the situation developed.

I asked Captain Southwick if there were any matters connected with the War College which required further attention from the staff. He said that he did not think so--that Captain Morgan had been down and he had given him the necessary information. However, he did show me a chart which indicated that the War College was being grouped with the Armed Forces Staff College, the Post Graduate School and Line School and others, and is to be placed in an appropriation to be divided among many groups. I discovered that the War College will get \$330,000. and the Armed Forces Staff College about \$700,000. Although the National War College was not included in this list and comes under a separate budget, Captain Southwick reaffirmed that its appropriation was about one million dollars. I took exception to the vast difference in appropriations between the three principal colleges. Captain Southwick then admitted that we had been squeezed too long, and they were hoping now to raise our appropriations. It seems to me that if we have accomplished this much, we have accomplished a remarkable thing, for when Eupers volunteers the information that they are not giving us enough, we have won.

The Fleet setups have not as yet been established. The VCNO has not as yet been decided and until they have settled on him, they can't make other decisions. They have confirmed Ramsey and McGree for the Pacific, and have brought John Dale Price in to relieve Woo Duncan as DCNO (Air). They think Sherman may relieve Bieri, as the rumor is, he is to be in the Mediterranean. However, they admit that he may relieve Conolly and may temporarily relieve Ramsey. Admiral Boone is the new Chief of Strategic Plans, and Captain Carter, the old Chief, is to be Plans in the Pacific for Ramsey. Conolly is reported to have the inside track for the Naval War College.

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There is considerable agitation concerning the new Pay Bill, which fortunately has received an Okay apparently, if not in entirety, at least in principle, from Forrestal's Civilian Pay Board. It is strongly rumored that the Civilian Pay Board has recommended that all hazardous pay be removed, and the belief is that such a bill will meet with thorough approval in the Congress. The "Airdales" and "Submariners" are not thinking too much of this.

There are other matters under discussion in connection with physical retirement, but none of these seem to affect a man with over 30 years' service. It appears that present thought is that a man with 30 years' service will not even be given annual medical examinations on the retired list. The Congress appears to be after a Pay Bill for disability retirements which will deny younger officers, who are perfectly able to make additional money, of large pensions.

There is also a very strong rumor that Admiral Blandy has submitted his request for retirement. The President is reputed to have asked him not to quit, but Admiral Blandy insisted that it was his right, so the President then asked him to stay until he had organized the Atlantic Command. This is only a rumor, but I heard it from three competent sources, and it is probably right.

As a matter of fact, and this is a very personal comment, our good friend, Chick Glover, says that he has almost had enough and not to be surprised if I see his name on the retirement list one of these days. Others apparently feel the same.

All in all, the general feeling I got, not only in Washington but also in talking to officers who had been to a training conference at Norfolk and to a Washington conference and who were in my plane, was that the Navy is in very poor shape; that the destroyers had no one who knew anything from the Captain down, and that the larger ships had but one trained officer, and he, generally, the Captain.

The argument is advanced that this is the result of the war, but I submit that it is not the result of the war except in a degree. It is the result of the political machinations of a group of officers and some highly placed civilians to gain control of the Navy. In doing so, they apparently have wrecked it.

It is my hope that the War College will go a long way towards instilling a love of Flag among the officers here, and that they will carry that back into the fleet where it will do the most good.

R. W. Bates

0820

21 January 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. I am quite pleased that the War College is to have recognition in the new encyclopedia to be put out by Collier's, and I appreciate the opportunity of looking at the rough draft. My comments follow:

(a) I think that all that is important is included in the draft, but I do not feel that the grouping is correct. In addition, as I read this paper, I wonder if it is not somewhat on the defensive and if it is not unduly critical of the War College. (Note the second sentence of rough draft)

(b) I personally believe that what is desired in an encyclopedia article of this nature are four principal items, in the following order.

1. The Background of the College, its formation and initial difficulties in a manner similar to your last paragraph. In addition, it might be well to include here the different colleges, such as: The Senior College, the Junior College, and the Logistics College.
2. The Mission with any discussion thereon which you may deem necessary.
3. The Scope of the War College. Broadly what the College is attempting to accomplish, without, at the same time, discussing the reorientation of the War College with the inference that it was no good until we came here. Perhaps the inference is somewhat true, but I wonder if it is wise to broadcast our internal thoughts to the world.
4. The Type of Officers that are here with any comment thereon concerning their years of service or their relative position in the echelon of command.

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- (c) Finally, if you deem it wise, you might have a fifth paragraph in which you might discuss miscellaneous matters, such as the coordination of the armed forces and the integration of the fleet in joint operations with the Air Force and the Army, such as has been indicated on the rough draft.

R. W. Bates  
Captain, U.S.N.

0822

3 February 1948

Memorandum for Admiral Brown

1. Insofar as I can see, this schedule is satisfactory. I do not feel qualified to comment upon the division of time, as that is a subject within the province of others more closely connected therewith. I think that Col. Truman Smith's lecture might well be omitted and possibly Col. Bell's, depending upon how fully those subjects are handled by Col. Schmidt. I should like to include, as I have always indicated, a talk by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover on Communism within the United States.
2. I think if we can obtain an address by Mr. Dulles and by Mr. Freeman, we should profit richly thereby.

R. W. Bates

0823



5 February

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

1. While I subscribe to the idea that the Naval War College does not desire to enter into verbal conflict through the press on questions of employment of the Armed Services, I cannot feel that in view of what has occurred that we should endeavor to placate Mr. Robb Wilson at this time. Certainly, having told him that we recommend that before he write any more articles on naval warfare that he discuss the matter with someone who knows something about it, it would be unwise to suggest that he come up here and speak. What an article that would make for Mr. Wilson's column.
2. I would suggest that we wait a while and some day write to the head of the Herald Tribune and suggest that it might be well for his writer, Mr. Wilson, to visit the War College. By so doing, Mr. Wilson might learn much concerning our conception of modern practices, and we in turn might somehow discover what mental processes are prompting Mr. Wilson's line of thought.
3. I am reluctant to communicate with him directly from the College.

R. W. Bates

0824

23 March 1948

Memorandum for Captain S.E. Morison, USNR - Harvard University

I am taking the liberty of asking Commander Shaw to speak to you on the subject of an honor for Admiral Spruance from Harvard. As you perhaps know, Admiral Spruance will soon be retiring from the Navy. I am quite anxious, therefore, that a man of his extraordinary achievements, both in battle and as President of this War College, should be honored by the leading institution of learning in the United States.

I have had this thought in mind for some time, and while Professor Packard, the Harvard Professor of Speech, was here, I spoke to him about this. He said that he would look into it, but that he did not have anywhere near the tremendous standing enjoyed by yourself, or even by Professor Elliot, who speaks here on occasions. It appears to me that you are the logical person to come to in this case, because few people understand the naval war as well as you, nor understand Admiral Spruance's great contributions to our Nation's success in the Pacific.

I have asked Commander Shaw to maintain this recommendation of mine in the utmost secrecy, as I would not want Admiral Spruance to think that I had a hand in it at all. In the end, I suppose that Harvard handles honorary degrees somewhat like other great institutions of learning--that is, a recommendation is one thing, but a Board of Governors or Regents or some such Board passes on them. Therefore I do not feel that I am overstepping the bounds of courtesy when I suggest to you that you handle this matter. I hope that you feel as I do! If you feel that you do not choose to do it, or recommend that I drop it, naturally I will abide by your judgment.

I hope to see you down here one of these days. Until then, with best wishes for the Easter season,

Your Old Friend,

R. W. Bates

0825

26 April 1948

Memorandum for Commodore Dees

I am afraid that the writer does not understand clearly what Mahan was driving at. Mahan's basic principle was the necessity for gaining command of the sea. This can be accomplished by (1) destroying enemy naval forces, (2) by containing enemy naval forces (blockade), and (3) by diverting enemy naval forces. The fundamental principle adduced was therefore this rather than battle fleet supremacy or concentration of power. Concentration is not generally considered a principle of war. It is one of the factors which makes up superiority.

The adequacy of the Mahan concept insofar as the Japanese were concerned was satisfactory in World War II. The Japanese understood the idea of sea power and command of the sea in limited sea areas. However, as Mahan pointed out long ago, the second most powerful fleet is in a hopeless position against the first most powerful fleet. Of course this includes the support of air power both land and carrier based, and not ships alone.

Mahan's concept was not lacking in adequacy. So long as a nation commands the sea, the defeat of an island empire like Britain or Japan is probable, and the adverse effect on a continental nation can be decisive.

I think that if the writer would consider the concept of command of the sea rather than that of balanced fleet or balanced military establishment, he would discover that the concept is still valid. However, command would no longer be obtained primarily by the Navy alone, but would be obtained by sea-air power assisted on occasions by ground power. In other words, the principle is sound; it is the method of accomplishing the objective which changes.

I cannot subscribe to the view that the idea of employing bases as springboards is new. Bases have always been so used. Dispersion, coordination, increases in range, concentration are hardly principles, but are instead considerations regarding the methods of employing modern weapons. Most of the writer's comments on these considerations are interesting but somewhat sketchy comments upon war in general. He appears to have an excellent understanding of how war today may be fought, but he does not appear to understand the philosophy of war nor the so-called principles which have been developed by different thinkers.

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I cannot concur with his view that the Navy will be solely an amphibious command, that carriers are obsolescent, that the air force has discovered something new in the idea of concentrating at the objective. What is concentration anyway? Under present conditions, and considering our most probable enemy, the Navy will probably strike first unless Allies give us adequately situated air bases. How will the logistics for such overseas air group be provided?

On the other hand, the writer has given considerable thought towards this problem and is deserving considerable credit for attempting to answer a most difficult subject.

R. W. Bates

10 May 1948

Memorandum for the President

The analysis of the Battle of Midway is now complete. All matters discussed by you on your sheet have been included as modified by the conferences.

- (a) The item concerning the contact report discussed on Page 325 is not quite clear yet. What is included in the article is as reported by Captain Mitcher.
- (b) The discussion of the HORNET VB Group is still in the book. No change whatsoever has been made on it for the reason that Admiral Brown said that he felt that Commander Air Group 8 did not handle himself well and that the book should properly include a comment concerning his actions. Admiral Brown reread what is in the book and considers correct.
- (c) You will find in the battle lessons one in particular with which you may disagree. In this connection I should like to invite your attention to Battle Lesson No. 6. I have tried to rewrite this to accord with what I think your views are. I feel that you concur that it is much better to control naval forces from a base as near to the scene of combat as possible than from one far away. Such a condition would have obtained at Midway had facilities been available ashore. You have stated that such facilities did not exist. However, the conduct of the action indicates plainly in my mind the truth of the basic lesson "keep your command post as near to the scene of action as possible."

R. W. Bates

0828

UNCLASSIFIED 14 May 1948

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

I returned from my trip by rail as the planes from Quonset were grounded.

My trip as a whole was quite successful. Everyone was extremely friendly and quite anxious to help. I gained the impression everywhere that the War College was increasing in importance and respect. I will now discuss the points which I discussed in Washington.

(a) I took a copy of Midway to Captain Parker, who was in the Aleutian Campaign, and whose opinion I greatly admire. Captain Parker read this work and was extremely complimentary. I have left a copy with him for further study, with special relation to the Aleutians. He says that his biggest job in the Aleutians was keeping Admiral Theobald on an even keel in his relations with the Army. Captain Parker has a high regard for Admiral Theobald and thinks that he worked under most extraordinary difficulties.

(b) I saw Captain Southwick in Bupers, who is in charge of finances. He said that he was extremely gratified at the success of the Battle of the Coral Sea, and that if I will bring the final copy of Midway to him by hand, he will see that it does not get "lost"--as the Coral Sea was. In this connection mail seems to go adrift because I told Captain Southwick that we had written him a letter about the fine job he did in printing the Coral Sea, and he says that he never got it at all. This does not appear to be an unusual occurrence. Captain Southwick also said that if we wished more copies of the Coral Sea he would have them printed. He has included the cost of this job and of Midway and of possibly the following two analyses in his budget. The cost does not appear to be very great. He could not give me a figure on it but said not to worry about it.

(c) Captain Chandler, who was in charge of Publications in CNO, says that the Battle of the Coral Sea arrived at a remarkably timely hour and had considerable effect upon the high command in convincing them of the need for a study of war. Captain Chandler said that it was read by both Admirals Ramsey and Sherman throughout, and met high approbation in those quarters. He is extremely anxious to read Midway before he leaves for sea in about two weeks. I plan to send him a copy shortly.

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(d) Admiral Olsen is no longer with the CIA and has been replaced by a civilian, a Mr. Andrews. I spent about a day with Mr. Andrews and the various officers connected with translations in the CIA. It is not clear whether we will get any additional translations at the present or not. They want to do what they can to help. My guess is that we will get certain additional material that we desire for Savo Island. Evidently the CIA is still short-handed and is still working on Japanese studies of Russia. However, it appears that today's studies are more post-war than were the studies on which they have recently been working. I am writing to Mr. Andrews today to further the good cause along.

(e) I went to the General Board and had a long talk with Vice Admiral McMorris, who is ordered away as Commandant 14 Naval District. Admiral McMorris said that he was glad to get his orders to the 14th Naval District but that he had not expected them for another year and they were quite a surprise to him. He further said that he had read the Battle of the Coral Sea from cover to cover and found it highly interesting and instructive. He said, however, that there were several points in it with which he was inclined to disagree. He couldn't quite remember what they were. I asked him if they had provoked him to think about them and he said that they had. I then replied that that was one of the objectives of the work--to provoke thinking along the lines of command. I then asked him if he had looked over the War College replies to his questionnaire on the concepts of a Russian war. He said that he had not as yet, but he had heard that they were very fine. I asked Admiral Momson of the General Board whether he had read them, and he said he had and that they were generally excellent. Admiral McMorris said that although the time for replying to the questionnaire was limited, the results had been gratifying.

(f) The General Board is being broken up to a degree. Vice Admiral McMorris is being relieved by Rear Admiral Shafroth. Admiral Momson is relieving Admiral Styer at the submarine desk in CNO, and other changes are in prospect.

(g) I saw Vice Admiral Struble, who is now DCNO operations. Struble is having quite a time shaking down, and told me that he is working too hard and that it did not make sense. I told him that that was the way Sherman worked and I did not think it good executive quality to try to do everything one's self.

Admiral Struble said that he would like to use the War College to solve some of his problems. He said that he wondered if the War College would be willing to have him submit several problems a year to the college for solution, probably by the entire

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college, including the students. I asked him what kind of problems he referred to and he said, "Well, supposing we had the problem of sending forces into the Persian Gulf--what about that?" I then told him that we had had two problems similar to that in the college and it was right down our alley. He said that he had not as yet seen any of the War College problems. He asked me if I would discuss this matter with the President of the War College. Admiral Struble does not think that the world situation is serious at present but he and others think that the coming months until September are dangerous months, and that it is possible, of course, that the Russians may move during that time.

(h) The Assistant Secretary for Air, Mr. John Nicholas Brown, stopped me in the corridor and asked me to call on him, which I did. Our conversation was very friendly. Mr. Brown proposed employing the War College in a manner similar to that suggested by Admiral Struble, but on different subjects. Mr. Brown said that he is constantly being called to the Hill and questioned on matters for which he is unprepared and his staff are unprepared. He said that they were unable in Washington, because they are so busy, to think these matters through, and he thought that he might turn the War College loose on some of his problems.

I think that among other things he was perturbed somewhat about the questions arising in the Congress over what Services shall do what. I told him that in my opinion the fault lay in a lack of National Policy and a lack of national planning. I told him that if we established National Policy and then developed a National Strategic Plan to support that policy and broke this plan down into tasks, we could then assign responsibility along functional lines. This would clear the whole air, I thought. To this Mr. Brown replied that although he believed that this was true, however, we had to remember that we were dealing with human beings and that these human beings were fighting for a place in the sun for their branch of the Service. This made it difficult to operate along functional lines. He suggested that I discuss this matter with you also.

(i) I had a long talk with Vice Admiral Hill. Vice Admiral Hill said that from what he could hear, the War College had reached a high level of accomplishment during the past year; that everyone was very friendly, and that his own people who were here for Op 11 had been extremely complimentary. Hill, however, is getting a little touchy about the Naval War College and its gradually improving position. As an example, he said that he didn't think it right that there should be an advanced class slated for the Naval War College presently. He said that his college was the advanced college and should properly be the headquarters of any advanced class. To this, both Mrs. Hill, his daughter and myself all lent a deaf ear.



It is too bad that Admiral Hill is also functioning along the personal line referred to by Mr. Brown rather than along functional lines. In this connection, while I was in Washington, one Captain in Supers who has been ordered to the National War College, says that he would like to come to the Naval War College afterwards, as he thinks he would get more along the line of command in war here than at the National War College. This was a new wrinkle to me.

(j) I had quite a long talk with Vice Admiral Fechteler. He said that they were holding up all action on high command orders until they heard as to the Congress' action on the 4-star bill. My opinion after talking to both Fechteler and Struble is that they think there is a strong chance that such a bill may pass. The Army is blocking the bill to a degree because they do not like General Mark Clark and they say that if this bill passes, General Clark will be on their hands for ten years. Admiral Struble seemed to have a feeling that should this bill pass, Admiral Spruance might remain here for another year. Admiral Fechteler seemed to question that, but said there was no decision yet. Someone advanced the thought, and I think this was Admiral Fechteler, that perhaps Admiral Kinkaid might reverse his refusal to head the War College were he to retain his 4 stars. Admiral Fechteler also said that should the above not eventuate, the choice still lay with McCormick, Beary and Griffin. Evidently Beary has quite a pressure group working for him. However, I had a feeling that Admiral Fechteler favored Admiral McCormick, and he said that should McCormick become President, then Admiral Smith would relieve Admiral McCormick as Commander Battleships-Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Fechteler said, and I think Admiral Struble also, that they did not plan to send anyone to the War College as President who was not a graduate of the War College. I told them that I thought that this was sound provided there was a suitable President available.

(k) There is considerable unrest in the Navy Department, as the Civilian Secretaries are in complete control. Admiral Styer told me that he heard that he was being detached through the kindness of a junior officer who came in to tell him that he was sorry he was leaving. He said that he had not asked to be ComSubPac, but that he had expected to remain in his present job to finish what he was doing. He said the Secretary had decided to remove him for no suitable reason, and that the antisubmarine board was fighting to retain him. He felt that he had been so badly treated, that he decided to retire, and while I was talking to him they told him that his orders to inactive duty had been signed. Admiral Clocclough was being assigned as ComSubPac by the Secretary without apparently any recommendation by the naval command as such. In this connection I was told that all flag officers must be cleared through the Assistant Secretary for Air. But whether they meant only aviation Admirals, was not clear.

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(l) There seems to be an opinion among some officers, one of which I think was Mr. John Brown, and another possibly Rear Admiral Roper of Eupers, that the War College was on a level with Leavenworth and the Air University. I endeavored to dissell this illusion by saying that it was not so, that we were on a higher echelon, and that I personally had a feeling that it would do harm to the War College to reduce its present high level of military thinking.

(m) The Chief of the Chaplain Corps had luncheon with Admiral Roper and me, and he announced that he was going to quit, much to the surprise of Admiral Roper, who asked him when. Admiral Thomas then said that he thought he would quit by July 1st, as he had decided that he had had enough. Admiral Roper asked him if he had a job or anything, and he said that he did, that it wasn't too much but was connected with the Methodist Episcopal paper, I think--some sort of high level capacity.

(n) I saw Admiral Ofstie, but I didn't get much chance to talk to him, as he was called away. I will speak about this to you privately.

(o) As an example of what may be troubling flag officers I was told that Admiral Brown might be relieved presently at Portsmouth by Admiral McCain. Admiral McCain has been ordered to the General Board ad interim. Admiral McMorris does not know that the assignment is temporary and it is possible that Admiral Brown does not know about it either.

Everyone in Washington was very friendly and I was gratified at my reception everywhere.

R. W. Bates

0833

24 May 1948

Memo for Chief of Staff

1. I should like to recommend that the Heads of Department including the Senior Army Representative be excused from watch standing, and that the Senior Watch Officer be the next senior officer following the above. My reasons for this recommendation are many, but the principal reason is that there are too many watch officers. The result is that not only is contact lost but so is interest.
2. The officers to be excused from watch standing are therefore:
  - Captain Gail Morgan
  - Colonel Feodor Schmidt
  - Captain Bern Anderson
  - Captain Henry Eccles
  - Captain Randall Dees
  - Head of Department of Correspondence
  - Captain R. W. Bates
3. This will leave about 41 watch standers, which in my opinion is still too many. Perhaps the Chief of Staff might desire to relieve others of this duty.

R. W. Bates

0834

23 August 1948

Memorandum for Commander Shaw

With reference to Captain Morison's memorandum of 21 August, 1948, I wish to reply as follows:

- (a) Question: Did the normal movement of convoys to and from West Coast or Panama and Hawaii, Samoa, Fiji, Australia, etc. continue during period of Battle of Midway? If so, were their escorts somewhat reduced in order to provide Fletcher, Spruance or Theobald with more screen?

Answer: CinePac's War Diary for the months of May and June does not indicate that there was any change in the normal movement of convoys to and from the West Coast, etc. Convoys of as many as 20 or more ships were steadily moving from San Francisco to Hawaii and some convoys of lesser numbers were moving on to Australia and New Zealand. Most of these convoys had escorts of 1, 2 or 3 destroyers or, in some cases, of a cruiser and a destroyer. Some, particularly on the run between San Francisco and Hawaii and vice versa, appeared to have no escorts. It does not appear as if the screens for the combat forces were built up by robbing the escorts, as these were too limited already.

- (b) Question: Was the real reason for Saratoga's delay in departing San Diego want of escort? If so, why wasn't Pye ordered to send him some of the DDs in TF 1?

Answer: The answer in this case appears to be "No", as on 24 May the Saratoga, Chester, San Diego, Craven, Dunlap, Fanning, Dale, Aaron Ward, and Laffey were directed to assemble at San Diego as TF 11 effective 0000 Zebra, June 5th. However, on 31 May the above ships which comprised TF 11 were directed to depart for Pearl as soon as practicable. Between 24 and 31 May this Task Force was operating in the San Diego area training pilots for carrier qualification and firing gunnery exercises, fueling and provisioning.

R. W. Bates

0835

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

19 September 1949

MEMORANDUM TO:     CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject:            Mission, Task, and Scope of Command and Staff Course.

Ref:                Your memo on the same Subject.

I have studied this paper and personally feel that it is satisfactory. Founding new Courses is a difficult matter; and, in my opinion, and from my own experience, I believe it can best be done by means of what you so aptly term, "The Evolutionary Approach." I helped found The Line School of the Navy. When the opportunity arose to start this school, I was, at the time, holding the position of what is now known as Dean of Engineering at the Post-Graduate School. The idea, of course, was originally Admiral King's. Captain Theobald wrote the ordnance features of this Course for the straight Line students, and I wrote the engineering features. We realized at the time that it was practically impossible to lay down any course which we would be able to maintain without a change of some sort. We therefore drew up a Course, broad in scope, and watched it gradually change and evolve into the present Line Course of the Navy. It seems to me that a similar program will be necessary here. What we have to do is to insure that the course is the best we are able to provide under the circumstances.

I have read Captain Eccles' paper and I concur with some of it, notably the point that officers will be chosen from the Command and Staff Class to serve in the Senior Course (or whatever the latter may be called).

I also concur with Captain Eccles in his statement that there should be an overlapping somewhat similar to the one he has placed in his diagram. Such an overlapping is desirable and necessary, inasmuch as students of the Command and Staff Class should properly render assistance to the officers of the Senior Class when the latter are fighting their battle problems on the Maneuver Board. Also, the fact that lectures, presentations, and items of that kind are for the benefit of all students, necessitates that students belonging to both classes should attend them.

With regard to the titles of the classes, I personally would much prefer to see the so-called "Junior Class" changed to "Staff Class" and the present "Senior Course" renamed "Command Class." I have never liked the

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Subject: Mission, Task, and Scope of Command and Staff Course

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title "Command and Staff Class," such as is employed at Leavenworth, and do not know its origin. I recognize that a Major is a field officer in the Marine Corps sense, and that Command, as in the case of a Lieutenant Commander, is also an important function. But the younger officers are basically, I feel, being trained in this new Course for Staff work and the nature of this Staff work should be emphasized in the title. I do not like the title "Naval War College Course", and I never have really enjoyed the titles of "Junior Course" or "Senior Course."

I am awfully glad that we are about to start such a Course. I honestly believe that, in time, the effects of the new Course (whatever called) will prove of great value to the Naval Service.

RWB:ca

R. W. BATES  
Commodore, USN  
Head of the Department of Analysis

0837

8 Mar 1950

**MEMORANDUM**

**From:** Head of Department of Analysis  
**To:** Chief of Staff

**Subj:** Proposed Naval War College Billet Supplement on basis of an allowance of 62 officers

1. The allowance for the Department of Analysis as proposed in the Chief of Staff's Memorandum is far from satisfactory. A minimum of four officers is considered necessary for the proper evaluation of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.
2. This was the allowance authorized by the President of the Naval War College for both the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The allowance for the Battle of Savo Island was reduced to three. It was expected that the analysis would be less difficult than was Midway. Actually owing to the detailed nature of the Battle of Savo Island and the reduction in personnel, that evaluation was the more difficult.
3. The Battle for Leyte Gulf embracing as it does the reports from two large fleets and from the shore command on both sides, and consisting of three separate battles, VIZ Surigao Strait, Cape Engano and Samar, should be much larger in scope than any of the preceding battles.
4. The policy in the Analytical Department has been to provide one officer to study the Japanese side; one to study the Allied side, and one to prepare the advanced material from which the next evaluation will be made. The Head of Department has supervised the work of the above three officers, has provided most of the military philosophy, and prepared the final evaluation. To attempt this with but two officers would be long and tedious and of doubtful quality.
5. When the matter of the Battle for Leyte Gulf was under discussion it was my understanding that the President of the Naval War College stated (a) that the allowance of personnel for this analysis would be the Bupers allowance which at present is three, and (b) that if more officers are required we will have to get them from sources outside the War College, as no other members of the staff can be made available to the Department of Analysis.

R. W. BATES

0838

5 July, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER HARTMANN

1. I have tried to locate you before I left for the Coast but so far I have missed you.

2. I have told the yeoman Joseph Cavanaugh what I want in a rough sort of way but here it goes anyway. I wish:

- (a) That you would read Coral Sea, Midway and Savo Island to get an idea of the format, of the method of procedure and of the philosophy of the books.
- (b) I want to check up on all of the data available to us so that we can determine what we must ~~ask~~ for in order to get started on the Battle for Leyte Gulf.
- (c) It wont hurt, after you have read the books in paragraph (a) above to read Woodward's Leyte Gulf to get an idea of the battle. We, of course, go into great detail and therefore our progress is slow.
- (d) Once we have discovered what we have, we can begin to move. So that is an important item to investigate.
- (e) I have written to Washington about certain Japanese information I desire translated by our translator who has been hired by ONI. I don't know his name but I Understand that he is good.
- (f) Should you fly to Washington during my absence, it might be well to drop in and see Captain R.H. Rodgers in Room 5A 736 Pentagon and Captain T. Burrowes in Room 4C 539. You can thus begin to make contacts with our representatives in Washington.
- (g) If you will get the Leyte Gulf file from Mr. Fitzsimmons and will read it you will get an idea of the problems.

Best of luck,

R. W. Bates

0039



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

7 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY

During the period April 18th, 1950 to June 16th 1950, this office was assigned the services of the following two female clerk-typists:

(a) Honora T. Kelleher

(b) Muriel R. Perry

These two typists were assigned the heavy task of typing for photographic publication by the Government Printing Office the War College Analysis of the Battle of Savo Island.

Their work was of exceptionally high order and was done with such neatness, accuracy and good humor as to facilitate greatly the work of the Analytical Department.

It is requested that a note of this fact be made in their fitness reports.

R.W. BATES.

0840

8 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I have noted with interest the new organization the War College and I note the deletion of the Department of Analysis and its replacement with the "Special Project" under the President. I think that this is an excellent solution of the problem which heretofore forced the Department of Analysis to try to be all things laid down in the organization but which it was unable to do because of the shortage of personnel.
2. However, as I have often stated, the number of officers assigned this section is not adequate. This matter was originally discussed with Admiral Spruance in 1946-1947 and it was finally agreed that my staff should consist of three officers additional to myself although it was recognized that there should properly be a minimum of four. These officers assigned were Captain F.C. Dickey, Captain S.D. Willingham and Commander Donald B. Ramage. Upon the detachment of Captains Dickey and Willingham, Captains R.S. Smith and W.H. Ashford were ordered as replacements. Later, with the detachment of Commander Ramage, Commander D.C. Richardson was ordered as his replacement. Later still, BUPERS detached Captain R.S. Smith as Planning Officer for COMNAVFE and promised a replacement within 30 days but the replacement failed to materialize. BUPERS then arbitrarily cut the allowance for the Department of Analysis to three officers including the Head of Department. BUPERS stated that this was because of a shortage of officers within the service and that other commands were suffering accordingly.
3. The authorized allowance remained at three during the preparation of the Battle of Savo Island. My staff at that time consisted originally of Commander W.D. Innis and Commander J.O. Cobb. Then, during the two month period 1 May 1949 - 1 July 1949 while I was away on retirement leave and prior to my returning to duty, for some reason which has not been fully explained, Commander Cobb was transferred to the Intelligence Section without relief. This left Commander Innis all alone to handle the burden which he was quite incapable of doing. Upon my return to duty on 1 July, I discussed the matter with the Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Brown, and with the

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President of the War College, Vice Admiral Beary. I was informed that it was the belief that Savo Island was almost completed and that no more battle studies would be made at this time. This was somewhat surprising as the CNO had directed on 18 April 1949 (CNO letter, Serial 0319, P34) that the Battle for Leyte Gulf would be done upon the completion of the Savo Island study. However, in view of this above opinion and in further view of the fact that the study was well advanced, I decided to continue with my reduced personnel without making any effort to obtain the additional officer and thereby possibly upset the War College schedule which appears to have been firm on the assumption that I could operate with reduced complement.

4. On 7 December 1949, the CNO, in response to a query from the President of the Naval War College (War College letter NC3/086 of 22 November 1949) reaffirmed his desire that the study of the Battle for Leyte Gulf be accomplished by the War College as originally directed. As a consequence, I was called into conference by the President and the Chief of Staff and asked if I would undertake the assignment. I agreed providing an adequate staff were provided and providing sufficient translations could be obtained.

5. On 8 March, in view of the impending completion of the Battle of Savo Island, I wrote a Memorandum (hereto attached) for the Chief of Staff wherein I stated that the contemplated allowance of two officers was not adequate and explained the agreement which had been made with the President of the War College. I did this because the new Chief of Staff (Captain Donald Felt) was not familiar with this agreement.

6. The Office of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Operational Readiness have been working hard on the translation end but no action seems to be underway concerning the personnel end. In accordance with the original agreement one additional officer from the present War College complement should be assigned to this project.

7. It is my hope that, in view of the world situation, I shall be able to replace all officers with retired officers. If this can be accomplished, then the danger of a break in continuity of personnel with the ensuing delay in production will be reduced to a minimum. Experience has shown that it requires about three months to bring a newly assigned officer up to date with a project once it has been started. This, in my opinion is not acceptable as it seriously delays the

0842

completion of the Analysis.

8. The study of Command at any time is of vital importance to the Military Establishment. However, it seems of particular importance at this time because of the uneasy peace existing throughout the world. I am therefore particularly anxious to complete the Study of the Battle for Leyte Gulf as soon as possible because of the impact of this battle on the fortunes of World War II and because lessons may come out of it which may be of great value in the study of Command.

9. This Memorandum is being forwarded at this time for consideration in view of the presence of Rear-Admiral C.E. Olsen with his Shore Establishment Survey Board.

R. W. BATES

0843

## COMBAT COMMAND

This is an extremely interesting book. While its title and subtitle are not really indicative of its nature, it is presumed that they were chosen as "Catch titles". Actually the book is a concise history of the naval operations of the Pacific War including those of the amphibious forces.

Written as it is from the viewpoint of one of the outstanding carrier task group commanders, it is worthy of the close attention and interest of the reader. Unfortunately the material available to the writer did not contain the latest information and a considerable portion of his facts are not really facts at all. A few examples should suffice to support this view. Among these are:

(1) The statement on page 131 that at Midway "our retirement to the eastward during the night permitted the bulk of the enemy forces to escape." On the contrary the facts, from recent Japanese translations, are that had Admiral Spruance continued to the westward during the night he probably would have been destroyed. Admiral Yamamoto was planning to destroy Admiral Spruance's carrier task force with surface forces sometime after midnight that night. For this purpose he had already ordered, among other ships, four battleships of the KONGO class as part of the attack force. There were no battleships with Admiral Spruance.

(2) The statement on page 387 that the Japanese at Midway "neglected to guard their security by sending scouting planes ahead of their ships to find out what American forces were within the area, and in a position to threaten them." The facts from recent Japanese translations are that the Commander Japanese Mobile Force, Vice Admiral Nagumo, did send out such a search composed of ship-based and carrier-based planes. However, when he received word of the

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return of his Midway air striking group he disregarded this search and commenced re-arming the planes he had reserved for use against any American surface forces discovered. This contributed towards his being caught later with many of his planes on deck by Allied carrier-based aircraft.

(3) The statement that at the Battle of Savo Island "the approaching Japanese force made out the picket destroyer BLUE heading in the opposite direction and passed astern of her only five hundred yards away." Actually also from recent Japanese translations the Japanese force was at no time nearer the BLUE than about 9600 yards.

Admiral Sherman's opinions are entirely and peculiarly his own. His comments on the battleship admirals do a serious injustice to men who, as a whole were reasonably well alerted to the nature of future naval warfare. The capabilities of a carrier task group were perhaps not fully understood by them but they had employed carrier task groups as raiding forces for years and understood their capabilities and limitations. They were forced, to a degree, to be battleship minded, because the slow speed of their battleships, approximately 21 knots, seriously limited their freedom of action. The last slow-speed battleship, the WEST VIRGINIA was completed November 19th, 1921. From that date until November 13th, 1940 when the NORTH CAROLINA was completed no new battleships were built primarily because of the provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and secondarily because of rational economy. The NORTH CAROLINA and the SOUTH DAKOTA classes had a speed of roughly 30 knots and the ICWA class of more than 30 knots. These increased speeds were designed to increase the speed capabilities

0845

of the battleships with relation to the carriers as well as with relation to the slower battleships. Had these faster ships been built earlier is there any reason to doubt that they would have been employed with the carriers as were the Japanese fast battleships at Midway? Did we not so employ the NORTH CAROLINA at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons?

It is human that officers should love their particular branch of the service be it carriers, heavy ships, destroyers or submarines. It is unfortunate for the Nation, however, when this love becomes so prejudiced as to close the mind of an otherwise brilliant Commander, against branches other than his own. For by such a closed mind the Commander denies himself that clarity of thought which is essential to the proper solution of his military problem.

Admiral Sherman's conclusions and lessons are in general well considered. While not based entirely on "what actually occurred" and while they leave room for honest differences of opinion, they contain nevertheless sound military advice.

The book itself is often outspoken and critical. Its greatest value, therefore, should lie in its ability to provoke serious thinking on the part of its readers.

0846

21 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT

As a result of my trip to Washington, I have to report as follows:

1. PAINTING OF ADMIRAL BEARY

(a) There seem, at present, to be no funds which can be made available for this painting. I talked to Rear-Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr., who suggested we write a letter to the Secretary of the Navy stating probable and approximate amount and suggesting that the money be made available from contingent funds. This seems to be a doubtful course as the Secretary of the Navy has refused to pay for Captain Mc Afée's painting. Miss Mc Afée was head of the Waves. The Secretary stated that contingent funds were not available for such purposes.

(b) I suggested to Captain Crichton's assistant (Crichton was away) that the funds be made available from War College appropriations. I was advised that such funds could not be made available for this purpose; that Medicine and Surgery once used their funds in this manner and that the General Accounting ~~Service~~ *Office* told them that they would not approve such expenditures in the future.

(c) The final thought was that as BuPers has non-appropriated funds which are quite large, it might be possible to make some of this money available for this painting. Rear-Admiral McMahon, Vice Chief of Naval Personnel said that he was doubtful as to the availability of these funds for this purpose, as did Vice-Admiral Roper and McCormick. However, they are looking into this.

(d) I asked Admiral Wellborn if we couldn't get Commander Albert Murray, USNR, the artist who painted Admiral Spruance and who is now under contract with the Navy, but he said no, certainly not now, that they are releasing Murray on the first of September for reasons which I will discuss with you. There still may be a little hope here, however, for Admiral Wellborn stated that he planned to order Murray back for each specific assignment rather than keep him on duty continuously. He has several projects lined up now for Murray if he will take them. Perhaps Admiral Beary could get on this list. Perhaps another artist might be willing to paint Beary.

0847



## 2. THE MOVIE "THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA"

This movie was shown for a large assembly and except for a little knit-picking, seemed to get by very well. It is difficult for Admirals to comment about a picture which criticizes Admirals, as they see themselves in the same boat. However, Rear Admiral Briscoe (who seems to have some authority over these matters) and Vice-Admirals McCormick and Low thought the picture was fine. I have talked over with BuPers (Admiral McMahon) the possibility of including on officer examinations some questions on the command failures as shown by the War College analyses. He viewed this favorably. He suggested that I communicate with Rear Admiral Griffin, Head of Examining Board. I went to his office but he was away.

## 3. HISTORIANS

I have seen the historians of the Army, Navy and Joint Chiefs and all are very friendly and helpful. I think that we will have good liaison there. It should be observed that at the time of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, the present Air Force was under the Army, who has their records.

## 4. TRANSLATOR

The translator for Japanese reports has finally signed. He is a Eurasian named Kawakami who until the other day had been working for General MacArthur. He had been working in Tokyo for several years with the Army historians. I hope he is good.

## 5. OFFICERS FOR PROJECT SECTION

I had a long talk with both Admiral Roper and Admiral Watkins (the latter is now in charge of Personnel Control). Both Admirals agreed that it would be preferable to have retired officers on this assignment. Roper (who seems to have some Jewish instincts) said that it would be much cheaper also. They suggested that we write a letter, of which Admiral Watkins provided a rough form, requesting the establishment of an allowance for this special project. This request would probably be acted on finally by Admiral Sherman, as Sherman doesn't allow retired officers above the rank of Lieut. Comdr. to be on duty without his express permission. I said I would prefer younger retired officers if they are available, but Admiral Watkins said that retired officers below the rank of Captain are not of much value.

It is surprising how tightly Admiral Sherman holds the strings to so many things, and how fully he retains within his mind the happenings from day to day in many lesser matters. I suppose that, in time, he will feel free to delegate responsibility.

#### 6. SEA ASSIGNMENT FOR ACTING PRESIDENT

I suggested to Vice-Admiral Roper - I hope you don't mind - that when you are relieved by Admiral Connolly, probably in December, you be given Commander Cruisers-Battleships, Pacific Fleet as relief to Rear-Admiral DeBose. Admiral Roper said that he would give consideration to this suggestion, but would make no decision at this time. He stated that, in the end, the decision would once again be made by Admiral Sherman.

#### 7. SELECTIONS FOR REAR-ADMIRALS

I announced to the high command in Bupers and in Logistics that this Selection Board that is soon meeting to select Rear Admirals would in my mind be giving a damaging blow to the War College which the War College could not well stand at this time if they failed to select officers from the War College. The Board is composed of Vice-Admirals B.H. Bess, Carney, McCrea, Sprague and Rear-Admirals R.O. Davis, Kitts, Kendall, Schoeffel and S.S. Murray.

#### 8. ELECTRONICS

I spoke to Vice-Admiral Low about the Electronics Laboratory. Low was highly interested and seemed quite familiar with the importance of the projected installation. He said that, in his opinion, this installation had been lost in the shuffle and that it would be wise to write an entirely new letter setting forth the back history, the difficulties now with the present maneuver board; the advantages of the electronics installation not only with reference to the War College, but also for the training of the staffs of any commander at sea; and the urgency of completing the installation in view of the world situation. He advised me to discuss the matter with Vice Admiral McCormick, VCNO. I tried to, but McCormick and Sherman were busy about the Tokyo trip so the matter was necessarily dropped until later.

#### 9. AIR FORCE

I went in to see the Air Force Detail Officer on a personal matter. While there, I told him that I was disappointed that the Air Force had seen fit to detach the four Colonels in

S & T class; that we had wished them as students in order that we might profit from them and they from us. The Detail Officer said that he could not help it as he had been directed to detach them. I also told the Detail Officer that although I was speaking unofficially and solely for myself, I could not but be concerned when I realized that these officers were being detached to no special assignments but were asked instead to give their preferences. I amplified this by saying that in my mind there was only one place they could ask for - Korea - and that if they did not, I would be concerned about them. He agreed thoroughly. Actually, the conversation was quite friendly.

10. DEPARTMENT ATTITUDE

The Korean affair does not seem to be causing too much commotion around the Headquarters. The Navy feels that they have been vindicated to a considerable degree and are willing to let it go at that. I hope that we thereby do not forego our efforts to continue to place the Navy's position adequately before the world.

R. W. BATES

0850

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7 September 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

During the past several years the Analytical Section has been working on a study of the Battle of Savo Island.

All of the charts for this study were prepared by John H. Wilson, GS9, War Game Expert who is attached to the Drafting Room. These charts, which were large, difficult and numerous, were extremely well done and reflect great credit upon Mr. Wilson, upon Mr. Charles Ward, the Head of the Drafting Room under whom Mr. Wilson serves, and upon the War College as well.

I found Mr. Wilson to be capable, understanding, devoted, with a fine working knowledge of naval matters and eminently qualified for drafting work similar to that necessary to the study of the Battle of Savo Island. It was a pleasure to work with him.

R. W. BATES,  
Commodore, U.S. Navy, (Ret.)

0851

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

18 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The first three paragraphs of this letter are satisfactory, although I think that paragraph 1 is somewhat misleading. Four officers were actually employed in working on the Coral Sea and Midway, and two to three on Savo Island which was a mistake as Savo was tougher than the other two. However, I do not subscribe to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, as they are exactly the reverse of what I desire and the reverse of what was discussed in Washington with Vice-Admiral Roper and Rear-Admiral Watkins. I suggest therefore that these paragraphs be reworded into one paragraph as follows:

"In the event that these two additional billets are approved, it is strongly recommended that they be filled by retired officers of the rank of Captain. This will maintain the continuity of the analysis and will facilitate its progress. Long delays have occurred in the past because of the detachment of officers before the analysis was completed. Officers selected for this duty should, if practicable, be graduates of the Naval War College; have served on staffs or in command in combat areas, be interested in plotting and in the evaluation of conflicting data and, finally, one should be an aviator with carrier experience; the other with general line experience. Should the Navy Department not desire to recall retired officers to active duty at this time, then it will be acceptable to the War College for the above two billets to be filled (a) by active officers, (b) by reserve officers."

To: Commander Bates

*R. W. Bates*  
R. W. BATES

*Noted - I argued the letter  
as written a year with you in  
part. but feel letter as written will  
get best results.*

*RLS*

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

Pl6-1  
Ser 2459-50(H/SGB:ok)

20 SEP 1950

From: President, Naval War College  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: Chief of Naval Personnel

Subj: Increase in officer Allowance, Staff Naval War College;  
Request for.

Ref: (a) CNO Ser 0319P34 of 18 Apr 1949  
(b) NWC ltr Pl6-1 Ser 8460-50 of 31 July 1950

1. Reference (a) assigned the task of analyzing the Battle of Leyte Gulf to the Naval War College. Experience gained on the analyses of the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway and Savo Island indicated that at least four officers are required to effectively and expeditiously analyze the Battle for Leyte Gulf, since three separate fleet actions are involved which will require much more research than the other Battles.

2. Two officers of the staff are now assigned to the Special Projects Section of the Naval War College that will undertake the task of analyzing the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Under the present allowance of officers for my staff, no readjustment can be made to provide the four officers required without jeopardizing the accomplishment of the mission of the War College.

3. Accordingly, it is requested that the officer allowance for the Naval War College be increased by two. In this connection, attention is invited to reference (b) which requested an additional billet for a legal specialist. The resultant total will then be 66.

4. Officers of the following qualifications are desired:

- (a) combat experience and familiarity with naval tactics, plans and orders;
- (b) interest in plotting and evaluation of conflicting data;
- (c) one officer with carrier air experience if possible.

5. It is realized that at the present time under world conditions now existing, that it might be impossible to make available active duty officers. In the interests of completing the assigned job in a reasonable time, the ordering of retired officers with suitable qualifications to this duty will be acceptable.

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6. In the event that it is not the policy of the Navy Department to recall retired officers to active duty at this time, it will be acceptable to the War College if Reserve Officers are assigned to this duty.

T. R. COOLEY  
Acting

0854

24 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the fact that the Electronics Command Evaluator was originated under the Presidency of Admiral Spruance, I should like to recommend that Sims Hall be divided into two halls. One hall, the present hall occupied by Logistics to be known as Sims Hall - the other to be occupied by the Electronics Command Evaluator to be known as Spruance Hall.

R. W. BATES

0855



24 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT

As per orders I left for Washington D.C. on Tuesday night and returned Saturday afternoon. As a result of my conference I have to report the following:

(a) THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND will be redone into two books - one of the written word - the other of charts. Bupers says that they will try to send a copy of what the G.P.O. plans to publish to the War College for approval prior to printing. This would be somewhat like a galley proof. I hope that they can do it. Bupers and others interested were quite surprised at the poor quality of the G.P.O.'s work as evidenced by their Savo Island product. I have asked them to expedite the work.

(b) The movie - THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY - requires additional funds. I obtained funds for two "productions" - a "production" is an arbitrary name for a 20 minute film - so we have funds for 40 minutes more which should be sufficient. The photographic laboratory wanted to keep the movie short but the V.C.N.O. said "no" - he wanted it as long as necessary to make a good picture. So that is settled. Bupers gave the money very readily. Apparently the showing of THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA earlier has had a stimulating effect. No arguments at all.

(c) The question of two additional officers for my staff seemed to have been settled before I arrived there. Every one was very friendly - McCormick, Roper, McMahon, Green and Watkins - and they have sent me - it arrived today - a list of the recently retired officers - so that I may designate whom I wish. If these won't do then we will have to look over other records. I pointed out to the high command that what I am seeking is workers. I don't want people who wish to be Admirals because they are Admirals on the retired list. I want them interested in the work, glad to be busy and anxious to complete the job with distinction. On this basis I am planning to write immediately to Fred C. Dickey who was senior aviator on the staff and served as my air representative on the Coral Sea study and to Einar Johnson who was Head of the Strategy and Tactics Department under Spruance. In fact, Admiral Watkins gave me their addresses and suggested I query them unofficially before the department did officially. They will be expected to serve as captains.

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(d) I looked over some of the film being shot for the War College movie SOLUTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM and it seems to be progressing favorably. The characters are paid actors and generally appear excellent. One, with an accented voice, I did not like so much but one gets used to him.

(e) I spoke to Vice Admirals Low and McCormick and to Rear Admiral Briscoe on our Electronics Command Evaluator. All are thoroughly in favor of it. Low thinks it is well launched - Briscoe says the Chief of Naval Operations took it lock, stock and barrel and with maximum number of stations; about fifty; McCormick indicated that it was well to get on with it as there was a tightening of money, particularly of electronics money.

(f) I asked for an additional yeoman who knows shorthand. There seemed to be no problem in that at all. Captain Gano said that they would set up a billet for this. It costs the War College nothing. Barchet is quite satisfied.

(g) The possible relief for Admiral Cooley has not been determined. A meeting was held on it but no decision has been made. Jimmy Fosskett was offered the assignment if he could get relieved from the Standing Committee Planning Group (NATO) but that looks unlikely. Tex Settle has his eye on it.

(h) The trouble with the billets of Chief of Staff, War College and Commanding Officer, Naval Base is that there is a shortage of Admirals. Bupers says that we are allowed 150 Admirals and that is not enough, as 36 billets are being used for assignments not originally contemplated. Bupers also says that the Chief of Naval Operations has asked for 185 Admirals. At present there are about 180 line Rear-Admirals on the active list.

(i) There are too many retired Rear-Admirals. The present CNO has endeavored to change the law, but Congress refused to do so. Congress says that it is present policy to continue to promote officers on the Retired List until all officers have been advanced. I personally do not approve. I think that it would be better to promote officers to Commodore rather than to Rear-Admiral. I told Fechteler this long ago. I don't like to see the rank of Rear-Admiral filled up with a goodly percentage of bums and suggested a new rank of Commodore-Admiral.

(j) No one knows yet who will be made head of NATO. It is possible that one of three officers - Clark, Bradley or Eisenhower - will be chosen. However, there is a strong belief that Clark will get it. Should Bradley be chosen, then it appears probable that Sherman will be made chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Then the high command - McCormick and Low - think that one of the four star Admirals may get it - Radford, Fechteler or Mick Carney. Others who might get it are Duncan, McCormick or Low. Low seems to want Duncan to get it but that would make the CNO and the Cairman both flyers. My guess is that Fechteler, Carney McCormick or Low are the most likely candidates.

(k) Bupers wants to publish THE BATTLES OF THE CORAL SEA and MIDWAY in book form now that the pamphlet form has accomplished its mission. SAVO ISLAND would probably likewise be delayed a year or more until errors had been discovered or objections cleared up one way or another. I suggested that we endeavor to lower the classification before printing which was agreed. So I discussed the matter with the VCNO who would like it done and he referred me to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Johnson. Johnson said to send in a letter asking for a lower classification and he would see what he could do. As this was what you had already recommended to me I was quite pleased.

(l) There has been another anti-plucking board which met on October 2nd and terminated October 12th. Admiral Leahy headed it with Kincaid and Hewitt plus 2 others but it seems to be so hush-hush that no one was talking about it. I ran into it by accident in the JAGS office. So they showed me the schedule. Naturally I made no effort to discover who was plucked (by non-promotion). This board seems to have gone through 1916 but what percentage was employed and who was considered is not known at this writing.

(m) I had lunch with the President and some members of the Brigadier-General Selection Board - Marines. They seem to have their feet on the ground. Are all in praise of General MacArthur, who told Admiral Joel Boone (MC) that the 1st Marine Division, recently in Korea, was the best division he had ever commanded - Army or Marine.

(n) Saw Captain Orem - recently selected Admiral. He is trying to go to sea. So is Pete Atkeson, unless he comes up here, which seems doubtful, as the shortage of Flag Officers seems to have killed the Flag Course here. You probably know more about this than I do.

(o) The Navy is planning to employ comptrollers throughout the Naval Service. The top comptroller at present is Asst-Secretary Floberg. Admiral Hopwood is his assistant. I saw a letter

0858

being drafted by Floberg's staff on the subject of obtaining naval officers (about 140 of them) for this assignment. To my surprise the third reference was to a battle lesson on command from THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND. Comptrollers are to be selected on outstanding qualifications only. Whether the War College will have a place in their training I do not as yet know. I should think that Logistics might have an interest although it is my understanding that financial understanding is highly important. However, I am not clear on this as the whole idea is still simmering in the pot.

(p) Bupers is making a movie on leadership. Their first attempt was a "flop". They have now asked COMONE (Rear-Admiral Thebaud) to make one. Bupers consulted me as to whether their "flop" could be shown at the War College to COMONE. I said that on November 6th the movies of THE CORAL SEA and MIDWAY would be shown at the War College and that an interlocking device would be available on that day. So perhaps COMONE will show up for a trial run. Bupers said that he had not as yet agreed to undertake the job and wants to see the "flop" first.

(q) The War College seems to be more and more recognized. Our graduates are doing well and are in many places - from Korea to the Middle-East.

R. W. BATES

0859

7 December 1950

REPORT OF TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON - 6-7 DECEMBER 1950:

1. OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY:

a. Discussed translations of Japanese documents with Mr. Kawakami. He is now in the process of assembling Japanese Command Organization for SHO 1. Covered the problem of the indication of references.

b. Met RADM HEFFERMAN and thanked him for past and future assistance from his office.

2. BUPERS:

a. FLEET TRAINING DIVISION:

Captain TOWNER has been relieved by Captain RICE, and has relieved Captain VARIAN in officer detail. Spoke with CDR WILSON and CDR YOUNG. There will be NO advance copy of the rebinding job on Savo Island. The books are expected to be finished by Government Printing on 22 December. Fleet Training is ready to go to press with a hard bound edition of Coral Sea and Midway as soon as corrected copies are received from The War College. There will be advance copies of these new printings.

b. Complements section (CDR ABBOTT) and Shore Distribution Section:

These sections - saw only the lower echelons - stated that their interpretation of the recently received complement of Special Projects was that of the 4 authorized (1 CAPT 1100, 1 CDR 1300, 2 LCDR 1100). COMO BATLS filled the CAPT billet and CDR WHITE one of the LCDR billets, leaving unfilled 1 CDR 1300 and 1 LCDR 1100. They also stated that their cards showed

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that the War College was presently in excess of complement enough to cover these additions, and normally in such circumstances no effort would be made to find additional officers to fill these new billets. They did say that the ranks as given in the complement would not necessarily bar filling them by other ranks including retired or reserve officers. The matters affecting the War College staff were not discussed in any way by me as I am neither qualified nor authorized to do so. The whole inquiry was opened to determine what effect the allocation of LCDRs to this section might have in the original idea of finding retired Captains, if that idea is pursued.  
~~xxxxxx~~. Apparently none. It was noted the OpNav action on the original War College request had not specified ranks.

3. OP-342 - FLEET READINESS:

Saw CAPT RENKIN who is going to relieve CAPT BURROWS in January. He had no more information on the movies. He did mention that the MIDWAY movie, 6½ units, took a sizable portion of BuPers annual allotment of Training Films, which is only 20, and that if the SAVO ISLAND movie was also long, difficulties might be encountered in the allotment of units of film. This possible future problem was also raised in BuPers Fleet Training.

Also, discussed with CAPT RENKIN a project of review of a new combined tactical publication as requested by CAPT ENSEY. This new publication worked out with representatives of other North Atlantic Navies, may replace USF-2.

4. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHIC CENTER:

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Talked with MR. SOUTHGATE by phone. Most of his information is contained in a letter written 5 December. He added that anything over 13,000 feet in the MIDWAY film will be paid for by Audio as the new contract stretches only to that figure. 5. The Washington visit was curtailed and hasty due to weather considerations. As it was, we were the last plane cleared for return to Quonset VFR on Thursday morning. Anacostia Aerology predicted that the field would be instrument for 2-3 days.

Very Respectfully  
P.S. Hartmann

0862

8 December 1950

**MEMORANDUM**

**From:** Head, "Special Projects" Section  
**To:** Secretary

**Subj:** Repairs to Microfilm Viewer

**Ref:** (a) Memorandum from Secretary to Heads of Logistics  
and Analysis Departments, History Section and  
General Files of 17 August 1949

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Secretary is hereby notified that repairs are needed to Microfilm Viewer No. 2015 now being used by the "Special Projects" Section in Room N-17.

R. W. BATES

0863



3 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER BALDRIDGE:

This invitation has to do with civic affairs. Both the Housing Authority and the Redevelopment Agency are City Projects, and the reason for this meeting on Sunday, January 7th, is to inform the incoming administration--that is, Mayor Lewis and the other important City Officials--as to the housing situation in Newport as of today, and what the Housing Authority and the Redevelopment Agency plan to do about it.

The Park-Holm Development is near One-Mile Corner, and is a pretty decent development.

The opinion seems to be that it is not important for the President of the War College to attend this meeting, unless he is very interested in housing matters, in which case he might desire to attend. On the other hand, it might be well if some member of the Staff, possibly the officer connected with housing--Lieutenant Commander SMITH--or even the Chief of Staff, attend.

It is my understanding that the Base Commander--Captain HAMILTON--who has a great interest in this matter, is not attending, and has declined, but is sending the Base Public Works Officer.

I hope this answers your query.

R. W. BATES.

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND**

29 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE:

1. In accordance with your orders, I proceeded on Sunday, January 21st, to Washington, arriving there that evening. I went into conference on the following day, Monday, and remained in conference for a total of five days, finally returning to Newport on Saturday morning. I found, as a general thing, that everyone in Washington was quite helpful, that they knew well what this section of the War College was accomplishing, and most everyone seemed anxious to help. I did not have a conference with Admiral Sherman. I met him in the corridor, and made an appointment with his Aide for 2:30 Friday afternoon, but Admiral Sherman got delayed on the Hill, and all appointments were cancelled. However, I did have several discussions with Admiral McCormick, who functions with considerable authority.

2. I will now discuss the various matters which arose on my trip:

(a) TRANSLATORS: I discovered that Mr. Clarke Kawakami, my translator, knew what we wanted and was anxious to accomplish what we desire. However, the amount of work to be translated is so enormous that he had become somewhat confused. Admiral Heffernan, Captain Morison, and everyone in the Historical Division, plus certain ONI officers, particularly Commander Bromley who handles their special affairs, all said that he was the best man available in the business that they knew of. I had a long talk with Mr. Kawakami, with ONI and CNO, and it was agreed that the best answer would be to have additional translators. I have been promised a minimum of one and a possibility of two more translators. This should be a considerable help toward clearing up the difficulties which have been gradually growing up in the past several months.

Admiral Wellborn, who has the funds, was thoroughly in favor and stated that money was no object -- they had plenty of money. Admiral Espe said that should there be a hitch with CNO he felt confident that ONI would be able to discover more funds for at least one additional translator. So, I presently expect to hear that my translation difficulties are over. The job is now underway to locate the additional translators.

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(b) THE PROJECT SECTION: While down in Washington, I discussed with Admiral "Casey" Green, with Admiral Roper, with Admiral McMahon, and with Admiral Watkins, all of BuPers, the status of my section. I also discussed the matter with Admiral McCormick at the request of BuPers. I discussed the Project Section with these officers because there is attached to our officer allowance an expiration date of June 30th, 1951. I wished to discover whether these temporary billets were to be reestablished every year, or whether this June 30th meant the termination of my additional allowance. Admiral Green stated that it meant just that -- that the allowance of additional officers for this section would expire on June 30th unless otherwise ordered, and suggested that I discuss the matter with Admiral McCormick. Admiral McCormick said that was not the plan at all, and thereupon directed Admiral Green to establish the billets as permanent. When this has been accomplished, this section's allowance will be four permanent billets. Admiral Green said that because of the necessity for readjusting billets in the Navy, it would be several months, probably before this is accomplished.

I told Admiral Green that I couldn't offer anybody an assignment unless I had something definite to offer. He agreed on that, but told me that Admiral McCormick had made the commitment so firm that I could offer anyone I chose a permanent billet, such billet to continue in force until the Battle for Leyte Gulf is completed.

I promptly offered the billet to Captain W. F. (Dolly) Fitzgerald over the telephone, who announced that he would like to have it very much, so we made an appointment for the next day. Then he told me, with obvious embarrassment, that he could not take it because he was about to be a father after eighteen years, or some such time as that, and his wife did not want to change her residence at this time. He felt he had to get a job which paid more money.

I then offered the assignment to Captain Sam DuBois, who said that he would like it very much and would let me know within the month. The reason for his delay is that he seems to have some sort of a tie-in with the UN, but whether he is getting that assignment or not, I do not know. Although Captain DuBois is not retired physically, he got a minor heart attack playing golf, and I am not sure whether the Navy Department will authorize him to work.

It is the opinion of BuPers that our best chance is to look over the officers who are about to retire this coming June, and perhaps several of them will be only too glad to take this assignment. If they will, BuPers said that they may be able to order them here now so they may continue on duty after retirement.

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(c) WAR COLLEGE ALLOWANCES: I noted over in BuPers that they were working, at the time I was there, on filling the War College Staff vacancies. They said the War College was to get everything they had asked for in Staff, but the boys in charge of the work didn't seem too impressed with our priority. I don't think that these officers, however, were to come here before August. I may be wrong in this, but I feel confident that they said that these were for next year.

(d) NEW CHIEF OF BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL: Admiral Laurance DuBose, now on duty as Commander Cruisers-Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, has been designated to relieve Vice Admiral John Roper as Chief of Bureau of Naval Personnel. Admiral DuBose will have both assignments now held by Admiral Roper, that is, DCNO (Personnel), as well as Bureau Chief. Admiral Roper loses his star and reverts to Rear Admiral. He takes over Admiral DuBose's Pacific Command.

(e) SOME PROSPECTIVE FLAG CHANGES: Vice Admiral Stump, Commander Air Force, ATLANTIC Fleet, will relieve Admiral Gardner as Commander SECOND Fleet. Admiral Gardner will relieve Admiral Ballentine as Commander SIXTH Fleet, and Admiral Ballentine will relieve Admiral Stump as Commander Air Force, ATLANTIC Fleet; Admiral Wellborn is taking over a Cruiser Division; which one I have forgotten, but it consists of two cruisers. He is being relieved by Rear Admiral Hartman. Rear Admiral Momsen, who is being relieved as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare by Rear Admiral Frank Akers, is relieving Admiral J. H. Brown as Commander Submarines, Pacific. I do not know what Admiral Brown's new assignment is.

(f) OFFICERS RETIRING: It appears that the officers retiring presently are Rear Admirals Robert Griffin, Oliver Read, George Fort, Roscoe Schuirmann, Daniel Barbey, Frank Braisted, Edward Hanson, Theodore Ruddock, Samuel Ginder, John Wilkes, Robert Hayler, Willard Kitts, Frank Beatty, and Fred Kirtland. Also, probably Arthur Robinson, plus probably one or two airmen whom I do not know. The names of Admirals Griffin and Fort were given to me by Admiral Farhion; most, if not all of the names, I believe to be correct.

The next anti-plucking board will meet, BuPers believes, this coming June, because there seems to be some crook in the law which says that an officer who is plucked can remain the year following that plucking. If they desire to have these Admirals go out June 1952, they will have to select them before June 30th, 1951.

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(g) A PROBABLE ASSIGNMENT: Rear Admiral S.H. (Slim) Ingersoll, who is Head of Strategic Plans, stated that he had constantly been bringing up the name of Admiral Conolly to be the Chief of the Standing Committee of Nato. This billet is presently being filled by General Bradley, but Admiral Ingersoll said that everyone felt that General Bradley was heading too many committees to be able to effectively discharge his duties in any one of them. I mentioned this fact to Admiral McCormick. Admiral McCormick said that there was no doubt but what Admiral Conolly was ideally suited for this assignment. However, he doubted very much if Bradley would be willing at this time to give it up to the Navy. I didn't press the matter any further, but if it does occur I hope that it won't be made effective for sometime.

(h) PROBABLE WAR: I talked over the prospects of war with certain key officers in ONI, and in other branches of CNO, and I also talked it over with one of the key men over in the CIA. There seems to be a divided opinion. Some feel that there will be war this year, some probably next year, some none at all. As the people I talked to all seem to have access to the same information, I would say that any definite knowledge of what may occur is non-existent. All are guessing, but, nevertheless, the Navy Department is working on the basis that it could well occur soon. This makes sense to me.

(i) ADMIRAL HALSEY: Captain Morison delivered an address on the Battle for Leyte Gulf before the Historical Foundation last week. There was a large attendance, including many high ranking Naval officers. Captain Morison took a crack at Admiral Halsey by referring to the three battles which made up Leyte Gulf as (1) Suriago Strait, (2) the Battle off Samar Island, and (3) Halsey's Blunder. I had dinner with Admiral Halsey several nights later, and Admiral Halsey then said that he had no objection to Captain Morison criticising his operations if he had reason to do so, that it was the American way, and he had nothing to say in regard to that. However, he did take exception to the fact that Captain Morison had stated that he, Morison, had consulted Halsey, as well as others of the High Command, and that this was their joint opinion. Admiral Halsey said that was not so, that he hadn't been consulted at all, and he was going to write Captain Morison about it. Captain Morison then told me that he had consulted Admiral Halsey, that immediately after the battle, he, Morison, had gone aboard Halsey's flagship and had talked with him, which talk Halsey had evidently forgotten.

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Captain Morison prefaced his lecture by the statement that the War College was preparing an analysis of this battle, which would be done some years from now, and which might change a lot that he, Morison, would say tonight, but that for the present this was the way the battle looked to him. Captain Morison, by this speech, succeeded in convincing everyone more than ever of the necessity for this War College study.

(j) OFFICERS FOR THE STUDENT BODY OF THE WAR COLLEGE:  
Vice Admiral Duncan discussed the War College with me, as I feared might occur when he saw me. As the President of the War College will remember, I mentioned to him this possibility. Admiral Duncan stated that the War College would get student quotas desired next year, so far as he could see at the present time, but that the bodies might not be the ones desired. He stated that it might be necessary to lower the caliber of some of the officers being ordered here, as some of the better officers might be required elsewhere. I took the liberty of telling Admiral Duncan that I didn't think that the War College would view this with any equanimity; that the Department's policy now provided the War College with only the ablest officers, and that this policy had been of great assistance in building up the standing of the War College in the Fleet.

Admiral Duncan also talked about the \$90,000 which was required for revamping the College, and stated that he felt that he would find the money somewhere.

Admiral Duncan also discussed certain command lessons, which he had discovered through his career, and which he thought of interest to me. I told him that I was pleased to note from his remarks that he had evidently been reading the War College Publications, Coral Sea, Midway, and Savo Island, because the command lessons which he was commenting on to me were stressed repeatedly throughout all three volumes.

(k) THE ORISKANY: The Oriskany is a converted CV which has been rebuilt with some form of outer hull, and as a consequence, her performance has been watched with interest. Recently, because of reports of excessive vibration, more attention than ever has been given to her. Upon her arrival at Guantanamo a day or so ago, it was discovered that her two starboard propellers had been seriously damaged, and were probably causing the excessive vibration referred to. Vice Admiral Low said he didn't know what action, if any, was going to be taken. The Commanding Officer of this ship is Captain P. H. Lyons, whom Admiral Low said was reportedly an excellent officer.

(1) ADMIRAL BROWN: While at lunch in the Flag Officer's Mess, I observed that Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, former Chief of Staff of this College, was present. Admiral Brown said that he had come over here to look into the future of his son at St. George's, who was thinking about the Army. Admiral Brown wanted to get him in the Naval Academy if he could. For that reason Admiral Brown went to Annapolis over the week-end, but he should be up in Newport in a day or so. I suggested to him that Admiral Conolly might wish him to give a talk to the College on what he was doing, to which Admiral Brown replied, "You know how long it takes me to prepare a speech -- about 3 months -- and I just can't possibly make a speech without suitable preparations."

I then suggested that he might step on the platform as Admiral Spruance used to do, and permit himself to be interrogated by the Staff and Student Body. I don't think that he was impressed by this, but I would say that he did not say no. I am sure that when he comes up here he will come into the War College to say hello, at least to the President and the Chief of Staff.

I did not get a chance to talk to Admiral Brown much about his job as everybody was tagging him at once, and every one was seeking something. I told Admiral Brown that he should have maintained his appearance in this country as confidential as possible if he wished to avoid being given a work out by the many. He looked first rate, but tired.

(m) MOVIE, SOLUTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM: I spoke to Mr. Southgate over the telephone concerning the movie made for the Tactics Department of the War College, and discovered that nothing was being done about it. I told Mr. Southgate that it was my understanding that the movie had been temporarily rejected until some additions could be made to it. These additions were to portray more completely the ideas which the War College particularly desired inserted in the film. Failing this, the film would probably be rejected completely.

Mr. Southgate seemed startled and hurt and said that in his mind it was an excellent picture. I told Mr. Southgate that his opinion was appreciated, but that he wasn't qualified to comment on what the War College wished in the picture, and that if the War College considered it unsatisfactory, it would have to remain so. I advised him to look into the matter some more.

I think that it will be necessary to obtain more money, (probably one twenty minute unit), before the picture can be completed properly.

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(n) MOVIE OF THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND: This movie should be made and plans are now underway to do it. However, BuPers said that they didn't have enough money to do the movie all alone, and referred it to the Chief of Naval Operations with the hope that CNO's Tactics Section might provide the funds. The Tactics Section said they weren't able to do this. There the movie rested until I arrived in Washington. I suggested to the representatives of BuPers and CNO that (a) they pool their resources on this picture, and (b) that in so doing they not expend all of their movie funds in one year, but might well spread them over two years as it would take that long to make the movie. To my surprise and delight, these two offices decided that it was feasible to do this. It is now my understanding that the Battle of Savo Island will be done by BuPers and the CNO, jointly, beginning after 1 July. Meanwhile, the Photographic Laboratory is working on a study of this movie in order to make an adequate estimate of its feasibility and of the cost. Mr. Southgate says that it is feasible to make most of the movie, but some of it may require new techniques. He suggested omitting those sections. I told him that insofar as it was within the capabilities of the producers I wished to follow the script.

(o) BRITISH OFFICERS AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE: Although I am not sure about this, I believe that British officers are either not at the National War College now or will not be allowed to be there in the future. The reason for this appears to be that either the Italian and the French, or both, have endeavored to have officer representatives at the College. As a consequence it was thought better to drop the whole affair than to have any nation represented other than the British.

3. Most of the above information has been given to the President of the Naval War College already, but this information is being forwarded for record.

Very respectfully,

  
R. W. BATES.

0871



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. Strother

DATE: 24 January 1951

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates

SUBJECT: The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress

1. Since speaking to you at the OCS and observation at the Linebarger Lecture yesterday, I have been reminded of a pamphlet by the Canadian General Chisholm on the Psychiatry of Enduring Peace.
2. While I am far from sold on this, it has some extremely interesting thoughts which I thought might be of interest to you.
3. Please return to me upon reading.

R.W. BATES.

0872

29 March 1951

MEMORANDUM

From: Head, Special Projects Section  
To: Secretary

Subj: Three (3) additional filing cabinets (lock);  
request for

1. The volume of data already collected for the analysis of The Battle for Leyte Gulf is currently threatening to overflow the filing cabinets now available to the Special Projects Section.

2. For the above reason, it is requested that three (3) additional filing cabinets (lock) be procured for this Section.

R. W. BATES

0873

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO USNTPS Newport, R.I.  
(Captain T. H. Hederman).  
FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, Naval War College.

DATE: 9 April 1951

SUBJECT:

1. With reference to the comment I made some days ago, I am interested in whether I can borrow from you for the next couple of months JONES, Clarence E., YN2, 206 10 19, USN, to assist me in obtaining data from microfilm?

2. This is not something new for the Commanding Officer, Training Station loaned me JONES for three or four months in the last two years, and he is familiar with our peculiar type of responsibility.

3. It is my understanding that JONES is at present working in the Recruit Training Command Personnel Office.

R. W. BATES.

0874

RWB:ca  
5 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I went to Washington under orders on Decoration Day, May 30th, and returned on Saturday, June 2nd. I saw Admirals McCormick, Cassidy, Duncan, Low, DuBose, Hartman, Miles, Curtis, Good, Coe, and numerous others. I discovered the following:

(1) Fort Adams:

This project is progressing splendidly. It has been approved by the Army and the Navy, and also by the Armed Forces Committee of the House or Senate. Today, Tuesday, the final approval is expected. Admiral Low should call you this afternoon. You may have any kind of commissioning ceremony you desire.

(2) Picket Boat:

The picket boat situation at the moment looks favorable. The matter should be settled in a day or so. Low seemed satisfied that you retain your picket boat providing he can get one of the picket boats away from Quonset. I saw Admiral Cassidy, and I believe that he is favorable. It all hinges on Admiral Sherman in the end. I believe that there are six picket boats at Quonset.

(3) Automobile

The automobile will be a "tough nut to crack". Admiral Low seemed somewhat unfavorable to the idea on the ground that the upkeep for these automobiles is very great. However, I did discover that certain of these automobiles are being retained by the Highest Command, such as King, Leahy, and others. On that basis, I advocated strongly that the same consideration be given to the War College as to these estimable officers. I based this on the ground that we had people just as ancient as the Five-Star Admirals, notably, Mr. Baruch, as passengers. Admiral Low said to write a letter giving the facts.

0875

(4) Money:

There is, at present, \$3500 in the Secretary's Contingent Fund, of which \$2500 was being given away at the moment of my arrival. I succeeded in stopping this giving-away and insisted that the funds be reserved until such time as the War College needs had been settled. I mentioned that the President, Naval War College, requires \$1,000, but could stagger along with \$500. Admiral Hartman said he saw no reason why we could not get it, provided we write a letter pointing out our needs clearly. He suggested mentioning the \$450. that Admiral Beary appears to have expended over and above his allotment.

(5) Advanced Class:

I discussed the question of the Advanced Class with Admiral DuBose and Admiral McCormick. Needless to say, both are entirely sold on the ideas expressed, but both have projected changes. Admiral DuBose desires to place the Advanced Class and the Research Section on the approved set-up of the War College but he says that at present he has no one to fill the quotas. Admiral McCormick, on the other hand, desires to incorporate the projected Advanced Class with the projected Refresher Course for Flag Officers. He considered that the new Research Section would be satisfactory. Once again, it's Admiral Sherman's final decision, and of course as I did not see him, I do not know what his decision will be.

(6) War College in general:

It is the universal opinion of BuPers and of most officers in the CNO's Office that the War College is one of Admiral Sherman's pets; that he is completely sold on it and its product, and that he is very anxious to improve it wherever possible. The subordinates seem convinced that the War College is Number One in priority and that so long as Admiral Sherman is Chief of Naval Operations, it will remain so. I am inclined to believe this, because Admiral Sherman is increasing the number of War College graduates in his top command. He now has McCormick, Low and DuBose among his principal assistants, all of whom are War College graduates.

RWB:ca  
June 5 1951

(7) London Situation:

Admiral McCormick said that it looked as though Carney would get the Mediterranean and that Admiral Fechteler, the Atlantic. Anyway, Admiral McCormick said that it was highly probable that there would be a commander in London. He inferred that this would not be agreeable to Admiral Conolly, inasmuch as the rank would probably be that of Vice Admiral. I told Admiral McCormick that this inference was probably correct. I also said that rather than waste all of Admiral Conolly's great talents and knowledge of the European situation, it might be well to reassign him to London with the rank of Admiral. I suggested that failing this, Admiral Conolly might be made Chief of NATO's Standing Group in lieu of General Bradley. Admiral McCormick said that there was going to be some reorganization. Needless to say, neither of these recommendations of mine fell on deaf ears; on the contrary, the conversation was exceedingly friendly.

(8) The Selection Board:

The Selection Board will meet on July 2nd. Admiral McCormick told me the names of some of those on it, but the matter is not yet firm. Admiral Fechteler will be President and probably Admirals Cassady, Ballentine, Johnson and Jimmy Fife, members. He also told me that you were not on this Selection Board and that he did not think you would be on the Anti-Plucking Board but that this has not been settled.

(9) The Battle of Midway Film:

The showing of the movie, The Battle of Midway, was highly effective and I received nothing but the highest praise from the Admirals who were there, notably: Coe, representing Air; Good, representing Chief of Naval Operations; and Hartman, representing Administration. All Admirals remarked on the number of battle lessons which were very effectively portrayed throughout the film as well as in the Battle Lessons at the end. We will be unable to show this film at Newport this session, because the film must be completed by July 1st and the company can not spare it.

(10) Retirement:

Admiral Riggs has requested retirement, as of August 1. (This information is confidential.) He did this because he couldn't get a suitable sea assignment and he did not

0877

RWB:ca  
5 June 1951

(10) Retirement (Cont):

choose to be transferred from shore to shore.

(11) Rearmament:

Everyone in Washington seemed satisfied with the Navy's progress in rearmament and considers that the Navy's handling of the Korean situation is being well done. I sensed among the higher command a tendency to relax. Let us hope not too much.

(12) Aviator for my Staff

I discussed with Admirals McCormick, DuBose, and Cassady the possibility of changing the allowance of my office from a retired Captain to an active Captain. Admiral McCormick told me to see Admiral Cassady. The latter asked me if I had anyone in mind. I informed him that Commander David C. Richardson who had been here a year with me was highly effective, whereupon Cassady said he would let me know. The aviators claim they are short 138 Captains. I said that on that basis, one Captain more makes no difference, with which statement Cassady, much to my surprise, more or less agreed.

(13) Chief Quartermaster:

My Chief Quartermaster, Merrill Stout, whom I have borrowed from the Base will be ordered to me to finish out his third year, which will be from 6 to 9 months, which is a very nice thing. This is being done because BuPers realizes that it has short-changed me in obtaining my Air Officer. Actually, I am using Stout on my submarines.

(14) The Battle of Coral Sea:

The Bureau of Naval Personnel showed the completed Battle of Coral Sea Film to the entire Bureau on Tuesday last. It was very well received and everyone was delighted with it. I received many encomiums.

- (15) From time to time, other thoughts will arise which will be of importance to you as President of the Naval War College, in which case I will advise you.

R. W. BATES  
Commodore, USN

0878

21 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Thank you very much for allowing me to see this memorandum from the Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Anyone who has been in a position of responsibility, particularly in war, and has had to plan operations of consequence, or to command such operations, must necessarily have discovered the same thing which Admiral Martin has here discovered. For many years, certain touchbearers have screamed about this necessity, and among those touchbearers I think we may start with Admiral Luce.

During the past war this need became very evident to me, and I feel confident would have become much more evident to others than perhaps it did, had we had less power than we did.

In the Analysis of the Battle of Savo Island - Battle Lesson 19 - I said in other language, exactly what Admiral Martin is saying here, but with considerably more emphasis.

I am delighted that our graduates are asserting themselves in the fleet, and I feel confident that if this continues - and I see no reason why it should not do so - in a few years we will have a top-notch Naval planning group.

Very respectfully,

R. W. BATES.

0879



2 July 1951

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. It has been suggested to me by the Base Chaplain that on the day when the War College officers report for duty - about August 17th - he be permitted to be at the War College to meet the officers so that they might know who he is, and obtain some advice on spiritual matters. After talking to the Chaplain for a while, who is an Episcopalian, I told him that it was an excellent idea, and recommended that, if approved by the Chief of Staff, the Catholic Padre come along if he so desired, as the Catholic Padre is an Assistant Chaplain on the Base. I am therefore recommending to you, as the Chief of Staff, that this innovation of having a Chaplain Corps representative here on opening day be accepted.
2. Perhaps even more important that the Chaplain Corps representatives would be the Medical representatives of the hospital. I therefore suggest that the War College Doctor on the Hospital Staff - Commander G. L. Calvi, Medical Corps - be invited to be present on that day so that the officers might meet him and learn the methods of procedure for handling themselves and their families.
3. Perhaps you might desire to include someone else on this list, i.e., Ship's Service, but the above two are the officers that one normally does not see unless there is difficulty.

R. W. BATES.

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Result of "foot-candles" test made in room 014, Naval War College by Mr. Hickey, August 14th, 1951

Commodore's Desk	20	foot candles
Comdr Hartmann's Desk	5	"
Stout's Table	20	"
Big Table N	10	"
" " SW end	15	"
" " SE "	10	"
Cavanaugh's desk	5	"
Carlisle's desk	5	"
Capt Rochefort's Desk	15	
Captain Rochefort's Table	20	
Big Brown Leather Chain	10	
Black Leather Chain	10	

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Required:

Office: Desk Work	30 Foot Candles
Fine Work	50 Foot Candles
Library: Reading Room	30 Foot Candles
Draftin Room:	50 Foot Candles

(Written in pencil) - Change present lights and replace with 4 light fixtures.  
Estimate \$550

0881

14 August 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Captain Chamberlin

As I have told you before, I have been dissatisfied with the lighting in my office in that it was inadequate. I have felt that this inadequacy has been affecting the efficiency of my office force. I therefore requested that the light expert on "foot candles" make a test of my office. This was done and the test was disastrous. The "light candles" were outrageously low and will endanger the eye sight of the entire office staff. I am sending you herewith a copy of the report which you will receive presently via official channels from the Naval Base.

I request that immediate steps be taken to light this office adequately.

I should like to suggest also, that a "candle study" of the War College be made by you. If you will do this, you will initiate something of great value to your fellow officers.

R.W. BATES,  
Commodore, USN (Ret).

Encl:

0882

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Secretary

FROM : Special Projects.

SUBJECT: Typewriters.

DATE: 8-22-51

1. It has come to my attention that the typewriters in use in this section, and possibly those in use throughout the War College, are not kept in a state of good repair. This office has three typewriters, and in the last several days two of them broke down. This is not an unusual circumstance.

2. For this reason in my quarterly request sheet I have requested two new typewriters. I hope that this request meets with your approval.

R. W. BATES.

0883

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Secretary, War College.

DATE: 29 August 1951

FROM : Special Projects.

6 Owpm

SUBJECT: Incinerator

1. I notice with considerable concern that the lessons of the past, in so far as the incinerator is concerned, have been overlooked this year as in the many years heretofore. I note that the paper being burned is blowing through the chimney and dirtying the entire area inboard of the War College. The amount of ashes that fall upon the cars located in back of the War College is surprising large.

2. I note that the City of New York is arresting firms which do not do there best to curtail or eliminate the smoke and dirt making practices now extant.

3. I should like to suggest that there must be some means available to keep the filth from coming out of our chimney.

R.W. BATES.

0884

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Emil E. Jemail, Daily News,  
Newport, R.I.  
FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN(Ret)

DATE: 31 August 1951

SUBJECT: Photograph

1. Thanks very much for the photograph you sent me of the Staff. It is good and I like it. You are very thoughtful.
2. I'm glad the British are here. It throws me in your path so I can see both you and your charming lady more often.
3. Let's have more of it.

R. W. BATES

0885

5 September 1951

MEMORANDUM

To: Chief of Staff

1. In line with this morning's conversation concerning the cases of Mr. Charles H. Ward, in charge of the drafting room, and Mr. John H. Wilson, his assistant, I should like to make the following comments:

(a) A Special Review Board to review all the Civil Service ratings, came to the War College about one year ago. As a result of this review, both Mr. Ward and Mr. Wilson, who were rated as War Game Experts, were rerated as Illustrators Naval Warfare and their pay was cut considerably. Both Mr. Ward and Mr. Wilson appealed to the Appeal Board Examiner. I was consulted by this Examiner because Mr. Ward and Mr. Wilson assisted the Battle Evaluation Section and because I had been in charge of Strategy Operations long ago. Captain Sweeney, among others, was consulted also. It was our understanding that the Examiner was going to recommend that there be no cut in pay for either Mr. Ward or Mr. Wilson. In fact, the Examiner stated to Mr. Wilson that his case had been improperly presented to his board and that he was going to straighten it out.

2. Nothing has been heard from this appeal which occurred in January of this year. Mr. Wilson states that he wrote to the Examiner in Boston who replied that he had heard nothing, but understood that the papers had been sent to BuPers for study. Why this was done, I do not know.

3. I should like to suggest that it might be well if the President of the War College or yourself take some action because of the delay in this case. My particular thought is that as Admiral Conolly knows Mr. Koehler, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who is in charge of civilian personnel, he might write him a personal note. Certainly, in my opinion, nothing is more conducive to a lack of morale than to have highly competent members of your civilian staff suffer salary cuts through no fault of their own and at a time when actually, because of living costs and services rendered, the opposite should have been the case.

R.W. BATES

0886

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College.  
FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN (Ret).

DATE: 2 October 1951

SUBJECT: Letter on policy

1. With reference to the matter I was discussing with you yesterday and the air force's attitude, this article would indicate that a major portion of this battle is already won.
2. This plan indicates that the Navy and Army and Air Force have divided up balanced forces in a manner suitable to the Air Force. This was what I was forecasting yesterday, and which must be countered to a degree.
3. All this talk is about material - about the number of air groups, and how many planes will be available by 1954. But, nothing is said about who will fly these planes or command the air groups or the larger air forces. My studies here always point out that the best material improperly led is almost useless and might just as well have not been built. Are we to build our security on an untested reed?

*R.W. Bates*  
R.W. BATES

0887



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

October 9, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: President, Naval War College

1. During your stay in Washington I should appreciate your courtesy if you will discuss one of my problems with the proper authorities.
2. As you perhaps know, I am entitled to one more officer for my staff. The allowance calls for an aviator. I was originally allowed to choose a retired officer if I wished, but none of the retired officers seemed suitable. Several contacted agreed to come providing they were brought back as Rear Admirals and with flight pay. This, of course, is out of the question.
3. It might well be that if you were to talk to Admirals DuBose, Greene, and Cassidy or with Cassidy's assistants, Admiral Bolger, or Blick in charge of Aviation Officer Personnel, you might be able to settle the matter readily. If I cannot get an aviator with suitable qualifications, it might be well to request an officer with submarine background, preferably a captain, and change the specifications accordingly.
4. What is required in this assignment is an officer:
  - (1) Who is interested in research.
  - (2) Who has had war experience, preferably combat.
  - (3) Who has had experience as a navigator.
  - (4) Preferably who is a graduate of one of the War Colleges - Naval, Armed Forces Staff, or National.
5. The vast volume of records to be studied and appraised requires that the officer doing research be utterly honest as to their evaluations. Therefore, officers who lean toward any branch of service are not desired.
6. The longer I must delay in obtaining my complete staff the longer it will take me to complete this mission. My estimate of two years, with the complete staff, may well have been too low.

*Returned to 0-14*

*R. W. Bates*

R. W. BATES

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9882

1. The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the plane was the cold. It was a sharp contrast to the warm, humid air of the tropics. I had heard that the weather in the mountains was perfect, but I didn't realize it would be so cold. I wrapped my coat around me and shivered. The air was crisp and clean, a welcome change from the sticky heat of the lowlands. I took a deep breath and felt a sense of peace. The mountains were truly a beautiful sight, and I was lucky to be here.

- (1) The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the plane was the cold. It was a sharp contrast to the warm, humid air of the tropics. I had heard that the weather in the mountains was perfect, but I didn't realize it would be so cold. I wrapped my coat around me and shivered. The air was crisp and clean, a welcome change from the sticky heat of the lowlands. I took a deep breath and felt a sense of peace. The mountains were truly a beautiful sight, and I was lucky to be here.
- (2) The second thing I noticed was the silence. It was a complete silence, a stark contrast to the constant noise of the city. I had heard that the mountains were quiet, but I didn't realize it would be so silent. I stood still, listening to the only sounds I could hear: the rustle of my coat and the occasional chirp of a bird. The silence was peaceful, and I felt a sense of calm.
- (3) The third thing I noticed was the view. It was a breathtaking view, a sight I had never seen before. The mountains were majestic and beautiful, with snow-capped peaks and lush green valleys. I had heard that the mountains were beautiful, but I didn't realize it would be so stunning. I took a deep breath and felt a sense of awe. The mountains were truly a sight to behold, and I was lucky to be here.

4. The fourth thing I noticed was the people. They were friendly and welcoming, and I felt a sense of belonging. I had heard that the people in the mountains were nice, but I didn't realize it would be so warm. I smiled and greeted them, and they greeted me back with a smile. The people were truly a beautiful sight, and I was lucky to be here.

5. The fifth thing I noticed was the food. It was delicious and healthy, and I felt a sense of satisfaction. I had heard that the food in the mountains was good, but I didn't realize it would be so delicious. I took a bite of the food and felt a sense of joy. The food was truly a beautiful sight, and I was lucky to be here.

Commis Bates -  
I had not so much  
as 30 sec to  
deal with this

WLS

1001 3 1000000

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Admiral

DATE: Monday,  
October 15th.

FROM : Bates

SUBJECT: Fitness Report CDR Bergen, USNR

1. The attached letter speaks for itself.
2. CDR Bergen's report was submitted. It is of a routine nature and is identical to that given other officers.
3. Do you wish a copy of this report to be sent to Com3rd?
4. Do you desire to submit anything additional?

R.W. BATES

0890

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2nd, 1951

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Conolly

I went to Washington as per your orders and have to report as follows:

ADMIRAL DUNCAN AND PLANNING

1. I had a half hour talk with Vice Admiral Duncan who is running the show while Fechteler is in Europe. I asked Admiral Duncan if he had anything that I could bring to you that was new. He said no, that the whole situation had remained dormant since you were here. He spent a considerable amount of time discussing planning with me and pointing out the numerous problems that the Navy had concerning officers trained in the planning process. He said all the graduates of the colleges were being asked for long in advance. This was heavily reinforced by Captain Dussault in the office of DCNO Air. I can tell you more about this personally as it went on and on and blocked a scheduled meeting of Flag Officers for fifteen minutes.

JAPANESE TRANSLATOR

2. The principal reason for this visit was of course the question of my Japanese translator. I succeeded in retaining her until next June through the good offices of the Civilian Personnel Director, Mr. LeMay and particularly of Admiral Curts. This whole affair was quite a relief and I am sure that if it hadn't been for the fact that I have been associated with a number of the high moguls for a long time we might not have gotten anywhere. Mrs. Tanaka is now being paid by the Psychological Warfare Section, which section does not as yet exist.

ADMIRAL DAVIS IS RELIEVED

3. Vice Admiral Arthur Davis, who has been Chief of Plans, has been relieved by General Cabell of the Air Force. General Cabell was head of the Air Force Intelligence and it is my understanding that the Air Force officers think that he is tops. The Navy wishes to withhold judgement.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE MELLOWING

4. Davis has no assignment as yet, but is evidently not going to

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sea. Admiral Duncan said that an unusual thing happened; that they wheeled in brandy and everybody in the Joint Chiefs drank to Davis. Duncan said that he promised that he would use Davis well. He is pretty deaf.

#### BUDGET

5. Budget is in full operation and all-hands are appearing before it. There is a very strong rumor that the budget for 53' will be cut 18 billion - from 61 billion to 43 billion of which the Navy share is expected to be from 12 to 14 billion. The 12 billion is the more likely. I do not see any particular concern about this.

#### NEW COMMAND SLATE

6. Vice Admiral Duncan is working on a new slate of high command, but he didn't leak to me what he planned to recommend to Admiral Fechteler.

#### CNO

7. Admiral Fechteler is in Europe for no other purpose than to familiarize himself with the European situation and to check in with General Eisenhower. Admiral Carney is reportedly doing better; in other words, his situation seems somewhat improved.

#### FOUR STAR IN LONDON

8. Admiral Ingersoll said that he was quite confident that there would be a four star job setup in London, but who was going to get it he didn't know.

#### WAR COLLEGE PERSONNEL

9. I talked up the question of the War College personnel, other than Mrs. Tanaka, with the Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral DuBose. We had quite a meeting and DuBose brought in all his Chiefs of Sections who were concerned. The story is about like this - Anna Rosenberg directed a 5% cut in Washington. This seems to stretch elsewhere as well. In order not to fire anybody, BuPers, where ever they could, froze the number of people at the last, "Reported on board that date." This was because they did not wish to fire anyone. The War College was frozen at 73 as this number was our on board at the freeze date - the War College's new allowance is 70 rather than 75, so we must attrite until we get to 70.

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I stated that Captain Chamberlin told me that we had been cut to 68. BuPers said that they presumed he was including the 2 temporaries. I told them that Captain Chamberlin would be down presently and they agreed to study the situation so that they could present a better discussion than they did with me. They admitted to DuBose that they weren't quite familiar with the War College problem. However, they told Admiral DuBose that the cuts of personnel for all colleges had been about the same percentage.

#### NINE WAVES

10. I told Admiral DuBose that we would be satisfied if we got the 9 WAVES or the 3WAVES, 3 WACS, 3 WAFS. Admiral DuBose said that he utterly refused to consider the latter because all colleges - Army, Navy, and Air Force - then would demand WAVES. He agreed however, that it might be possible to give the 9 WAVES to us providing he could increase our allowance of bodies, but at the present time this didn't seem possible. However, he is taking matters up with Anna Rosenberg and this would be presented to her providing it passed Admiral Fechteler. He stated that the papers on the case were in his desk drawer. He also stated that Admiral Sherman had flatly turned this request down once, but that Fechteler's reactions might be different.

#### NEED FOR SUCH A NAVY

11. Admiral Duncan said that among the questions that he was asked was why we need such a Navy and who was going to fight. I told him that I presumed that was included in the Admiral Conolly Memorandum, but that I could readily answer for him if he wished me to. He said no, that he knew the answer, but it was hard to convince some people. I think he was referring to General McNarney.

#### PRINCE BERNHARD

12. He asked about Prince Bernhard and how he got on here. I told him that Prince Bernhard's trip had been very successful and the Prince wanted to come back again. Admiral Duncan said that the Dutch wanted a Navy, but Nato wanted an Army.

#### CEDAR RAPIDS

13. Admiral Duncan wanted to know what was at Cedar Rapids that called for Admiral Conolly. I said that, although Admiral Conolly had a relative there, that relative did not originate the request and the Office of Public Information had told Admiral Conolly to accept, as Cedar Rapids was quite important to the Navy. The

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R. I.

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question was purely informative.

PAPER ON SEA POWER

14. I asked both Admiral Duncan and Admiral Ingersoll if they had read Admiral Conolly's Paper on Sea Power. They both said yes, and that it was quite good; was under study and that they would write to him presently about it. They said it was repetitious, but they realize why.

ADMIRAL FELT

15. Admiral Felt has reported in as Chief Strategic Planning and has not yet relieved, and there is no further information.

ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FOR WWII BATTLE STUDIES

16. Captain Dussault in the Office of the DCNO (Air) is still looking for my additional aviator. He has one available now named P.G. Bunce. Bunce is the Air Operations Officer for Admiral Jock Clark in Korea and was the same for Admiral Tomlinson who, by the way, is now ComAirPac. He says that Bunce is very capable, but had not been promoted and they didn't know why. I told him that I would find out from BuPers, which I did. Evidently Bunce, sometime in the war, got drunk on Johnson Island in the presence of some high Naval Command and was promptly relieved. Despite the fact that his record is almost brilliant today it seems that the selection board evidently does not trust him. He also recommended as available, Captain B.E. Grow, now Commanding the NAS, Atlantic City, Captain R.L. Hunter, now Commanding El Centro, and Captain A.I. Malstrom, now in CNO. He strongly recommended Hunter who stood second in his class and who he says is one of the really able officers of his time. He does not know at all why Hunter was not made an Admiral, excepting that the choice was limited. He suggested that I talk to Admiral Beakley about these officers to get an idea of them. I was very careful to stress to BuPers and DCNO (Air) Staffs that the President of the War College was anxious that every officer on the Staff of the College, if competent, be made a flag officer when his time came, and, therefore, officers who have not been promoted now when the selection percentages are so high are normally viewed with concern.

SECTION ALLOWANCE

17. The question of allowance of my section was taken up with

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Admiral Casey Greene, ACNO (Personnel). I pointed out that I was supposed to have four for my section and one for Morison. They have given me five for my section, and one for Morison. After talking with Admiral Greene we decided to leave it alone because I might need one of these spares in the future or the War College might. This would not require an increase in the total college allowance. I said that in view of this, I would keep the new allowance. I hate to put this in this memorandum because immediately some section head who might hear about it will announce that he is shorthanded and needs an extra man.

5% CUT

18. John McCrea, who is on Mrs. Rosenberg's staff, says that the 5% cut was made without reference to the advisors. She merely came in one day, called a civilian assistant, had him draw up the 5% cut order and issued without regard to consequences.

ADMIRALS THURBER AND SPRAGUE

19. Admiral Thurber is to command a battleship division of MISSOURI (F), NEW JERSEY, IOWA, and WISCONSIN. Admiral T. Sprague is on the way to Washington. No duty assigned as yet.

20. While in Washington I discussed matters with Vice Admirals Duncan, Low, McCrea, DuBose and Callaghan; Rear Admirals Ingersoll, Greene, Bolger, Blick, Curts, Miles, Hopwood, Hague, Phillips, Flet, Herrmann, among others.

  
R.W. BATES

0895



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN (Ret)

SUBJECT: Flag Rank changes

DATE: December 5, 1951

1. I heard some changes underway in Flag Rank as follows:

- (a) Martin 7th Fleet to relieve Struble 1st Fleet.
- (b) Briscoe to relieve Martin.
- (c) Struble 1st Fleet to relieve Badger, UN.
- (d) Fahrion DesLant to relieve Briscoe ComPhibLant as Vice Admiral. Relief for Fahrion not as yet designated, but believed to be Wellborn.
- (e) Boone, Europe to be relieved by Wright.
- (f) Wright probably to be relieved by Art Davis. (This is just my guess).
- (g) Dietrich to be Naval Attache London.
- (h) Salomon for Hopwood.

R.W. BATES

0896

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commander White

DATE: 28 January 1951

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates

SUBJECT: Copy of Address to be given at OCS Graduation

1. I am sending you herewith a copy of my address which I hope you and Captain Johnson will peruse. If you see something wrong, I should appreciate it if you will invite my attention to it now.
2. I do not desire this shown to any member of your staff below you in rank. This includes your office staff. It is for you and the Captain alone, and what it contains I don't want discussed. Outside of that, you may keep it for your files.

R.W. BATES.

0897